A Qualified Defense of Qualified Conformism

Given my background and views, I should be highly sympathetic to the positions laid out in economist Bryan Caplan's new book You Will Not Stampede Me: Essays on Non-Conformism (he summarizes the main themes of the book here). I'm a fan of Bryan's previous books on voter ignorance, immigration, and education (despite a few reservations about the latter). In addition, I'm a libertarian (a somewhat less radical one than Bryan, but more so than about 95% of Americans), an atheist (also like Bryan), author of a book on why majority views on political issues are often wrong because of systematic ignorance and bias, and an advocate of many unpopular views. People who know me well will tell you that I'm more likely than the average person to violate various social norms.

If anyone is a receptive audience for Bryan's new book, it would be someone like me! And I do indeed agree with a lot of it. For example, he gives excellent explanations of why many commonly held views are likely to be wrong. Bryan also effectively explains how you can often get away with non-conformism while suffering few or no social or economic penalties. On many issues, most conformists are unwilling to devote great time and effort to enforcing conformity! Indeed, doing so might get them branded as annoying fanatics, which is itself a kind of non-conformism that true conformists generally try to avoid.

For example, polls show that we atheists are an unpopular group. But, as Bryan explains, in most middle to upper-middle-class circles in the modern US, there are few or no costs to being an open atheist. That is similar to my own experience, as well. Though admittedly things would be different if I were running for political office, and possibly if I lived in a highly socially conservative Bible Belt area.

There are many other good points in Bryan's book, as well. But I think he and some other advocates of non-conformism may underrate some key arguments for—limited, but still substantial—conformity.

One is that conformism often makes good sense on questions you don't care much about. For example, I'm skeptical that moving towards gender-neutral language is a good idea, or that it does much to reduce sexism. But I don't actually care much about the terminology in question, and therefore usually go along with majority intellectual trends on these matters. I figure it's better to conform and thereby avoid unnecessarily alienating people, than to make a stand on a hill I don't care much about. Situations like this come up often. Bryan implicitly recognizes this when he recommends conformity in a few situations where the cost of non-conformity is high, and the benefit low. But he doesn't generalize the point—at least not clearly.

A more substantial problem is the possibility that some widely held norms and traditions might embody valuable wisdom, even if modern non-conformists don't understand why. This, of course, is the longstanding "Burkean conservative" argument for adhering to tradition.

The standard critique of Burkean conservatism is that history shows many longstanding, widely accepted traditions were horrifically wrong: slavery, serfdom, the subordination of women, persecution of religious dissenters, and more. This litany undermines the case for unthinking adherence to tradition, as a general rule. But there might be some categories of norms and traditions that deserve more deference than others. Back in 2008, I argued that Burkean conservatism is a poor rule when it comes to coercively imposed norms, including many of the familiar examples of awful traditions, such as slavery.  The same can be said for many that are the result of the imposition of majority public opinion in a democracy. The work of many scholars -including both Caplan and myself—shows that majority opinion on political issues is often heavily influenced by ignorance and bias, and that voters have little incentive to seek the truth and correct wrong opinions.

That doesn't prove democracy is worse than dictatorship or oligarchy. But it does mean we should give little credence to the idea that political views are likely to be right merely because they are supported by a majority of voters and embraced by candidates who win elections.

On the other hand, however, social norms that emerge from market processes or civil society are more likely to be well-founded. In such situations, people "vote with their feet" and thereby have more incentive to get things right. That's no guarantee of infallibility. Far from it! But it does suggest a stronger case for deferring to rules and social norms that emerged  in this way. If your workplace, your church, or your social circle has certain norms of behavior and civility, there's at least a substantial likelihood they make good sense, even if you may not understand why. Otherwise, these institutions would lose members, workers, and customers to rivals with better rules and traditions.

That's far from a guarantee of infallibility. But it does justify giving at least some substantial deference to norms in these situations. That's especially the case if you're new to the institution and have little knowledge of how it works, and what purposes its rules and norms might serve. The relevant comparison is not between the norm and perfection, but between the quality of the decision-making process that led to the norm, and the quality of your own judgment on the issue in question.

Finally, sometimes it makes sense to conform to the views of experts—at least in cases where there is a relatively broad consensus among the relevant experts, and they have relatively good incentives to seek the truth. I summarized the justification—and limits—of this kind of deference here, and more fully in a book chapter on "Trust and Political Ignorance."

Experts are far from infallible, and we should keep in mind biases and poor incentives that make them unreliable in some situations (as well as the tendency of many of them to opine on issues that are actually beyond their expertise). But we should also remember there are important issues on which experts' views are more likely to be reliable than those of laypeople. In those situations, a degree of conformist deference makes sense.

Even in situations where it makes sense to defer to tradition, norms, or experts, such deference should not be absolute. The case for deference could be outweighed by a large amount of contrary evidence, or moral considerations. But the burden of justification for going against "the herd" in such cases is higher than in areas where there is little reason to think that herd has any special wisdom or insight.

Some of these points are likely compatible with Bryan Caplan's views, laid out in his book. But he doesn't systematically incorporate them as limitations on his general (and often justified!) opposition to conformism.

They are also worth keeping in mind if you are the kind of person who views norms and traditions with suspicion. I am like that myself. Whereas the average person may tend towards excessive conformism, intellectuals—especially those who hold many unpopular views—may have the opposite bias. Such people are likely overrepresented among academics, political commentators, and possibly even readers of this blog.